

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 31 August 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

(Canada)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA
Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Mr. A. BERNIER

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. WINKLER
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. N. KRISHNAN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILOLO
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI
Mr. E. FRANCO
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO
Mr. B.O. TONWE

Poland:

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. M. STAHL
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. V.P. SUSLOV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

The Rt. Hon. F. MULLEY
Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. D.J. MOSS

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C. GLEYSTEN
Mr. G. BREAN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare open the 327th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Mr. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA (Brazil): The work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has reached a very important stage, one which might constitute a turning point in the disarmament negotiations that have been going on now for slightly more than five years. The tabling of two identical draft texts on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/192, 193) sums up the efforts deployed by their authors -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- during many months of negotiations between themselves. The final objective of such a commendable effort, namely to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, has always been supported by my country, which has already, through the regional Latin-American treaty (ENDC/186) renounced the possession and manufacture of such weapons.
3. Disarmament is a universal aspiration of mankind, and the effectiveness of any measure of disarmament is directly linked to its general acceptability and consequently to the universality of its application. That is all the more true of measures aimed at checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons, for obvious reasons on which I need not dwell here. Unfortunately, however, the texts that have been submitted by the United States and Soviet delegations do not encourage wide adherence by the maximum number of countries, as would be desirable. In my comments today I shall explain some of the reasons why, in the view of my country, the two drafts seem not to take into account the concerns of a large number of countries, as a result of which the prospects of their universal adoption are diminished.
4. Brazil has already stated in clear and unequivocal terms the necessity for what General Assembly resolution 2028(XX) called "an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations" (ENDC/161). Even a preliminary glance at the two drafts is enough to enable one to determine that they contain practically only obligations for the non-nuclear nations, while none of the commitments for the nuclear Powers suggested by the non-nuclear nations have been taken into account. My delegation has never agreed with those who believe that a non-proliferation treaty should necessarily be one-sided and discriminatory.
5. Owing to the diametrically different natures of the parties concerned -- nuclear-weapon Powers on the one hand and non-nuclear-weapon countries on the other -- complete symmetry in the substance of the obligations for both sets of parties, although

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desirable, could not of course be achieved in the context of a treaty such as that under consideration by this Committee. We are not questioning whether or not the nuclear Powers should stay nuclear until a final solution can be brought to the question of nuclear disarmament; but it seems to us imperative that the obligations imposed on the non-nuclear nations should be met on the other side by significant commitments related to the subject matter of the treaty. The manifest imbalance of obligations as set out in the two drafts can hardly enhance the prospect of universal acceptance and final adherence by the great majority of nations.

6. We notice also that the two drafts contain provisions which, directly or indirectly, prevent the non-nuclear countries from developing their own technology for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices intended for peaceful purposes. The Brazilian stand on this important question has been explained several times here and elsewhere. Suffice it to say, for the moment, that such a prohibition goes well beyond the objectives of the treaty and gives rise to serious and unnecessary problems.

7. Another important consideration which was contained in resolution 2028(XX) and which does not seem to be properly reflected in the two drafts is a clear characterization of the agreement on non-proliferation as a definite step towards general and complete disarmament. Nations that do not possess nuclear armaments are asked to sign a binding commitment never to acquire them, while nations that already have at their disposal the most impressive arsenals ever assembled by human ingenuity will be legally free to increase at will the number and the destructive potential of such weapons.

8. In the view of my Government, the ultimate answer to the question of checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the creation and maintenance of conditions of world security so that no nation can have a motive for producing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. With regard to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it may rightly be asserted that its full acceptability, and thus its effectiveness, rests on the pre-existence of such security conditions. Nevertheless the treaty must and can provide for the strengthening and institutionalization of those conditions of peace by establishing precise legal obligations in that regard.

9. To place the security issue in its proper perspective, it must be said in all frankness that it is not only the fact that some nations might produce nuclear weapons which causes concern for security; such concern is caused also by the fact that a few nations have already produced and keep producing those weapons in increasing

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numbers and, so to speak, of better and better quality; and, furthermore, by the fact that some of these few nations do not seem inclined to enter into any agreement restricting their nuclear-weapon capability.

10. Thus it is the possession of nuclear weapons which provides justification for yet another kind of obligation on the nuclear Powers, of which we find no mention whatsoever in the draft texts. I am referring to the need for appropriate guarantees against nuclear aggression or its threat on the part of nuclear Powers not parties to the treaty, as well as clear assurances that those nuclear Powers which are parties to the treaty will not utilize nuclear weapons against the nations which have renounced the utilization of such weapons as a means of ensuring the security of their own people.

11. Defence is an imperative concern of any government. If a country renounces the procurement or production by its own national means of effective deterrents against nuclear attack or the threat thereof, it must be assured that that renunciation -- a step taken because of higher considerations of the interests of mankind -- will not entail irreparable danger to its own people. The public could never be made to understand why a government, in forswearing its defence capability, had not at the same time provided reasonable and lasting assurances that the nation would not be, directly or indirectly, the object of total destruction or of nuclear blackmail. Nor would the congresses or the legal representatives of the people be able to ratify any international agreement which failed to take into account the minimal requirements of national security.

12. Let me recall at this point a passage from the speech delivered by the representative of the United States on 11 July. Mr. Foster, speaking in the context of a comprehensive test ban agreement, discussed the relationship between national security and arms control measures in general, and said:

"The appeal of arms control measures must rest on whether they enhance the security of the nations agreeing to them. In our deliberations on the non-proliferation treaty, for example, I have made clear my Government's conviction that no nation should be asked to sign this treaty if it does not promote its national security within the world community as well as meet the world-wide concern over the growing threat of nuclear war." (ENDC/PV.312, para

13. The conditions of world security and peace to which I have been referring would also be greatly enhanced if the universal application of safeguards concerning

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fissionable material were made compulsory for all parties to the treaty. By the same token, the legal commitment to take definite measures of disarmament could include outright several of these measures: the conversion for peaceful uses of part of the military stocks of fissionable material, the obligation to co-operate in the maximum diffusion of the benefits of scientific and technological progress in favour of developing countries, the channelling to those countries of at least part of the financial resources freed by disarmament measures, and so on.

14. It must not be forgotten that, in order to consolidate the achievement of the security conditions I have mentioned, it is necessary also to ensure the continuance of the process of disarmament, and particularly of nuclear disarmament, by means of the specific obligation to pursue the negotiation of parallel agreements on other important aspects of disarmament.

15. In the light of the foregoing considerations regarding the complex problems connected with preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons -- problems to which we must find universally acceptable solutions --, let me return to a point with which my Government is deeply concerned.

16. In our view, the countries that are willing to renounce nuclear weapons should not be forced, as seems to be the purpose of the draft texts, into yet another renunciation which would have incalculable adverse consequences and would be totally alien to the objectives of a non-proliferation treaty. In fact, no convincing argument of a purely technical nature can be raised in favour of the imposition of restrictions on the application by national means, under effective international control, of nuclear energy in the form of explosive devices intended for peaceful purposes, such as engineering works, mining activities and other civil uses.

Whatever the cost of such ventures, the foreclosing of any country's possibility to accelerate its economic development in such an important field of knowledge and thus to achieve a technological breakthrough that might be of vital significance for its industrial development would be so damaging to its future in the community of nations that no government would feel entitled to impose such limitations on future generations.

17. The most developed nations in today's world are those which invested heavily in the most advanced industrial techniques of a given historical period and were thus able to reap a thousandfold the benefits of the mastery of such techniques. The

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developing nations of today are the nations which most desperately need the tools with which to shorten the road in the race against backwardness. We cannot understand why precisely those nations should be denied them when it has been demonstrated, first, that they have no motive for acquiring nuclear weapons; second, that they are willing to accept the obligation not to obtain such weapons; and third, that they are willing to submit to a thorough system of international inspection which can objectively verify their good faith.

18. Brazil is a signatory of the only international agreement which prohibits nuclear weapons in an inhabited region of the world. The Latin-American Treaty (ENDC/186), the purposes of which we have always supported, encourages peaceful nuclearization and fully allows its parties to conduct research and to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including the manufacture of explosive devices for uses other than military. In Latin America -- within a homogeneous international community where special favourable conditions prevail -- we have made it clear that the renunciation of nuclear armament does not entail the abandonment of our inalienable right to economic and social development through the preservation of our freedom of scientific research and technological advancement. There can certainly be no reason, in a broader context, to adhere to a treaty imposing greater restrictions -- and restrictions which, in our view are both unjust and unnecessary.

19. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): Last Thursday, when identical drafts of a non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/192, 193) were presented to this Committee by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union, my delegation had the opportunity to welcome that fact (ENDC/PV.325, para.60). As was said in the statement issued that day by my Government and read to the Committee by Mr. Edelstam, the Swedish Government considers the presentation of these drafts to be the most positive action in the field of political détente since the conclusion of the Moscow test-ban Treaty in 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1). We are convinced that this very gesture of common endeavour on the part of the two super-Powers will help to reduce the tension in the political climate reigning in the world today. We hope ardently that the phase of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which we have now entered will lead to a joint recommendation on the complete text of a non-proliferation treaty to be placed before the coming session of the United Nations General Assembly.

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20. My intervention today is not intended to cover the whole draft treaty text as presented by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union. I reserve our right to speak at a later date on the contents of the preamble and the main articles. I can assure the Committee, however, that our main preoccupation now and in the coming weeks will be to endeavour to contribute to the achievement of such compromises as may prove necessary in order to make the treaty acceptable to as many as possible of the States which are important in this connexion. I will not hide the fact that one of our preoccupations concerns the desire to see inscribed in the treaty more binding obligations on the main Powers to regard this treaty as only a first step on the road towards nuclear disarmament, soon to be followed by others, notably a treaty banning underground nuclear tests and a cut-off agreement. The non-proliferation treaty has to be seen as a part, and only a part, of an integrated whole of partial disarmament measures in the field of nuclear arms.

21. I will now turn to the purpose of my intervention today, which is to help speed up our negotiations. I think all delegations around this table are preoccupied by the fact that the Committee is not yet in a position to discuss a complete draft treaty. This is the more deplorable as all parts of such an important engagement as a non-proliferation treaty are dependent on one another and complementary to one another. This is particularly the case with the relationship between the main articles and such a complementary provision as the one on international control. In order to facilitate the further debate and also to bring forward some thoughts and suggestions to be made use of, we hope, by the co-Chairmen in their continuing bilateral negotiations on this point, the Swedish Government has considered it useful to present to the Committee today a preliminary and tentative text^{1/} of an article on international controls: the article III left blank in the drafts before us. This presentation in no way, of course, reduces the possibility of my delegation's supporting any other text on this item which other delegations may put forward, should we consider such proposal better and more likely to gain general approval in the Committee than our own. I wish to emphasize that procedural aspect of our draft. That implies that my Government is not committed to the exact wordings used. Those have, as you will find, been most often borrowed from earlier proposals, in order to simplify the presentation. As an example I may mention that such a matter as the extent to which

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/195.

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equipment should be involved in the safeguard obligations is one for further penetration, here or within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

22. The Swedish text to which I have just referred, which is available to delegations here today is naturally closely connected with the two main articles, I and II, of the draft text put forward by the United States and the Soviet Union. I think that it also represents fairly closely the thinking of those two delegations with regard to the control measures necessary for verifying in a proper way the full observation by all parties of the obligations contained in the main articles. Only in one respect, to which I shall shortly revert, does our proposal contain an additional element, and that is aimed at promoting further the cause of nuclear disarmament, albeit by a modest beginning.

23. I will now give a brief description of our proposal as contained in document ENDC/195. Its main feature is the general application of one universal safeguard system, that of IAEA in Vienna. Nothing but such an equitable and non-discriminatory system would be tenable in the long run and in all relations between States in different parts of the world. For practical reasons, however, we suggest that there should be a transitional period -- perhaps up to three years, to choose as an example a figure previously mentioned -- to allow for the integration of existing bilateral as well as regional safeguard arrangements into the uniform system of IAEA. I reiterate that this suggestion is justified on practical grounds: my own country has bilateral control arrangements which cannot be altered overnight.

24. Our proposal further contains a unilateral obligation on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon States to accept safeguards on all their nuclear-energy activities, whereas, as you will see, the nuclear-weapon States would be allowed to be their own judges concerning when to apply safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities. This asymmetry is a concession on our part, hesitatingly made, in order to facilitate the political acceptance of our proposal.

25. In one respect, however, we suggest that international controls should be symmetrically applicable to all parties. This concerns transfers of special nuclear material from one State to another. All such transfers should thus be safeguarded in the same manner for all States parties to the treaty, intended as they should be

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for use in peaceful activities only. This suggestion may seem to go somewhat beyond what has been suggested up to now in the bilateral and regional discussions on a control article, namely that international controls will apply to material which is imported not only by non-nuclear-weapon States but by all parties to the treaty. This provision, is, however, in full conformity with the general principle behind articles I and II of the draft treaty, aiming at stopping transfers of nuclear weapons and assistance and encouragement in producing them. That is a salient feature of our proposal.

26. I wish to emphasize what should be self-evident: that it is of the utmost importance and in conformity with the whole spirit of the proposed treaty that States which renounce the possibility of manufacturing their own nuclear weapons should not contribute to the development of nuclear-weapon arsenals in other countries. Outright exclusion of such a possibility, in the form we suggest in the article on international controls, would in addition be of practical importance as an obstacle to deliveries of special nuclear material to such nuclear-weapon States as may not subscribe to the treaty.

27. In conclusion, I wish to stress once more that the Swedish delegation is not proffering its proposal in order to place any difficulties in the way of the speedy conclusion of a treaty. The contrary is the case. We have deemed it useful, for the bilateral discussions between the co-Chairmen and for the further discussions within the Committee as a whole, to see to it that a complete text is available, thus including a suggestion for solving the control issue. Our suggestions may not be acceptable to all delegations. In that case the further negotiations in the Committee will undoubtedly bring into the open whatever disagreements may exist and we may try, in a common effort, to arrive at a solution of this problem -- as of other outstanding problems -- which will be acceptable to all. It is in such a spirit of constructive compromise that we have drafted and today tabled our proposal.

28. Mr. WINKLER (Czechoslovakia): Allow me, on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation, to join those representatives who have preceded me in welcoming the presentation of the drafts of the non-proliferation treaty by the USSR and United States delegations (ENDC/193, 192) at the meeting of the Committee on 24 August (ENDC/PV.325) and in expressing appreciation of the work accomplished by our two co-Chairmen. This step has been rightly characterized by several speakers as an

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important milestone in the disarmament negotiations. Its importance is underlined by the fact that, as is generally recognized, the drafts presented are the fruits of several years of joint efforts by all who are interested in the adoption of effective measures to thwart the threat of a nuclear war.

29. The presentation of the drafts does not mean, of course, that the issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has already been solved. It makes it possible, however, for our negotiations to reach their climax within the shortest possible time with the formulation of the text of a treaty which would be in line with the interests of the greatest possible number of States and which would gain the widest possible support. We believe it is a good step in that direction that the drafts submitted by the two co-Chairmen pay regard in a number of points to the constructive ideas offered for consideration in the course of past negotiations by various countries, both members and non-members of this Committee.

30. At the same time we realize that the non-proliferation treaty cannot incorporate every idea and that there are of necessity certain limits to paying regard to individual suggestions, however urgent may be the reasons behind them. When considering those suggestions it is necessary, on the one hand, to take good care to preclude any weakening of the effectiveness of the treaty, avoiding any loop-holes that would permit a circumvention of the prohibition of the spread of nuclear weapons in any way or from any motive. On the other hand, it is necessary to keep in mind that the non-proliferation treaty must not be over-burdened by problems bearing on other aspects of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. It is generally recognized that attempts to settle all those aspects would inevitably delay the reaching of agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such delays might easily lead us into a situation where we might miss the present favourable opportunity for the conclusion of a treaty, and the agreement on non-proliferation itself, in the light of the possible future development of events, might become meaningless.

31. The foregoing aspects, which have evidently guided the considerations of the authors of the two drafts, should be decisive also in the approach of other States in their consideration of the drafts presented as well as in the solution of the issues still outstanding. In other words, in formulating the final text of the non-proliferation treaty there can be no compromise on measures to safeguard its effectiveness from the point of view of the prohibition of the spread of nuclear weapons in any form or in any way. Likewise, it would not serve our cause to demand

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that the treaty should solve problems reaching beyond the framework of non-proliferation, the solution of which, as past experiences have indicated, requires further efforts and, it seems, long negotiations.

32. That, of course, does not exclude the possibility that some States might voice the criticism that the treaty does not meet all their demands. In my opinion, you, Mr. Chairman, put it very aptly at our meeting on 24 August when you said:

"One can fairly safely make one prediction in regard to our negotiations and debates on this very important measure during the next few weeks, and that is that not every delegation here will be entirely satisfied with whatever text will be finally adopted." (ENDC/PV.325, para.58).

No international agreement is absolutely perfect. It would be unrealistic to demand particularly of multilateral international agreements concerning matters of principle and of a political nature -- such as is, beyond any doubt, the non-proliferation treaty -- that they should be fully consistent with the requirements of all parties. Whenever treaties of this kind are being worked out it is necessary to act on the premise that they should provide solutions to the questions of principle in a satisfactory manner and that in their fundamental provisions they should be in accord with the interests both of the international community as a whole and of its individual members.

33. Accordingly, when considering the drafts submitted and the final text of the non-proliferation treaty which should be the outcome of our present debates, it is necessary, in our judgement, to realize fully what is decisive in the treaty and what is its proper objective. Beyond any doubt the objective of disarmament talks is to eliminate the threat of war and, under the present circumstances, particularly the threat of a nuclear war. Within this context the non-proliferation treaty has an important, even though partial, mission. Its primary aim is to prevent that threat from growing and to unblock the road to its gradual lessening. A means of achieving that is to prevent additional States from acquiring nuclear weapons. In order to accomplish that the non-proliferation treaty must reliably close all avenues that might lead to such an undesirable development either within the framework of military alignments or within individual States, irrespective of the motives or the justification evoked.

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34. It is with a view to that fundamental, even though limited, objective that the Czechoslovak delegation has studied the two drafts presented; and it is in the light of that basic criterion that we regard the drafts submitted as constituting a significant step forward to the objective that has been sought from the very start of the debates on non-proliferation. This evaluation of ours is further accentuated by the fact that in their basic provisions the drafts are in full accordance with the principles formulated in the respective resolutions on the question of non-proliferation which were adopted at various sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. A detailed analysis of the drafts from that point of view was made by the representative of Poland, Mr. Goldblat, on 29 August (ENDC/PV.326). My delegation wishes to identify itself fully with his conclusions and does not think it necessary to dwell any longer on that question.

35. In evaluating the drafts presented, we would deal particularly with articles I and II, which stipulate the obligations of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States respectively. The scope of those obligations was for long the basic outstanding issue and the main obstacle to agreement. It was so because some States made attempts to limit the scope of the non-proliferation treaty in such a way as to allow for an indirect spread of nuclear weapons within the framework of their military groupings. In this connexion I should like to express my delegation's satisfaction that the two drafts contain formulations of articles I and II that meet the basic requirement for a non-proliferation treaty. They leave no loop-holes allowing for a spread of nuclear weapons in any way. A treaty including the obligations formulated in those two articles will really constitute an efficient tool for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

36. In those articles we see the core of the non-proliferation treaty. At the same time, we believe it is highly appropriate that the drafts presented are not restricted to that question alone. We are particularly happy that, paying attention to the position expressed by a number of States both in the course of our deliberations here and outside this Committee, the drafts express the relationship of non-proliferation to other questions, particularly to the question of the future development of activities in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is not the direct subject-matter of the non-proliferation treaty to provide a solution to that problem; there is no doubt, however, that it is closely connected with the treaty.

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37. Therefore it is, I think, fully appropriate that the drafts expressly underline that in no way will the non-proliferation treaty put a brake on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and that it will not limit the right of each party to the treaty to develop such activities in full. On the contrary, the treaty will provide favourable conditions for the development of such activities within individual States and the broad promotion of international co-operation and exchange of information for that purpose.

38. In that connexion, the drafts touch also upon the problem of the potential uses of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes -- a problem referred to again today by the representative of Brazil. A number of important statements made during past deliberations have rightly pointed out the close relationship of that question to the non-proliferation treaty. My delegation has already expressed its position in that regard. Emphasis has been placed on the necessity, arising from technological factors, that the question of the manufacture of nuclear explosives for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be covered by the non-proliferation treaty.

39. Past discussions have indicated possible ways towards an acceptable solution which, on the one hand, would not adversely affect the basic principles and objectives of the non-proliferation treaty, and which, on the other hand, would be in line with the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States and would provide them with the possibility of acquiring the nuclear explosives required for the implementation of their plans for peaceful economic development without discrimination and on advantageous economic terms. That is the spirit of the solution envisaged in the preamble to the two drafts, leaving the solution itself to appropriate international procedures, outside the framework of the non-proliferation treaty.

40. In studying the two drafts the Czechoslovak delegation has paid considerable attention also to their final provisions. We greatly appreciate that in formulating them the authors were evidently guided by the desire to codify the maximum possible stability and effectiveness in the treaty. That criterion was undoubtedly decisive in the formulation of the provisions concerning the duration of the treaty, the terms of accession by all States, the entry into force of the treaty, possible amendments and other questions of that nature. We assume that that criterion will likewise be applied in the negotiations on the remaining partial problems to be regulated in that part of the treaty.

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41. The drafts with which the Committee was presented at our 325th meeting do not contain a formulation of the article on international control to be exercised under the non-proliferation treaty. The major part of the significant statement made just before mine by the representative of Sweden was devoted to this important problem. I listened with the greatest care to the statement made by Mrs. Myrdal, for we have always attached great importance to the contributions of the Swedish delegation to disarmament negotiations. I am sure that nobody would expect me to comment now on the important and interesting statement just made by the representative of Sweden or, in particular, on the draft text (ENDC/195) submitted by her. Undoubtedly that draft needs and deserves careful study. My delegation will of course give it the utmost attention.

42. As far as the control issue is concerned, my delegation has made its position clear in previous statements. Therefore at the present juncture I should like only to reiterate that we stand for such control being exercised through the International Atomic Energy Agency by the application of that Agency's system of safeguards, which has been accepted generally throughout the world and is already applied in a number of States. Practice has tested its effectiveness and has proved also that it does not affect in any way the internal affairs of the States in which the safeguards have been applied; nor does it endanger their justified interests. Experience shows also that this system of safeguards could be put into operation with respect to the non-proliferation treaty immediately and without any delay. In that regard we have also the most qualified and expert opinion and assurances of the responsible officials of the Agency. For those reasons we expect that the relevant provisions of the treaty will be worked out in accordance with the preamble to the draft before us, which underlines the role of the Agency concerning the guarantees in connexion with the activities of States in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

43. Similarly, as regards the important question of guarantees of security for the non-nuclear-weapon States which, under the treaty, would assume the obligation not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, we welcome the respective statements made by the two co-Chairmen to the effect that they will continue their exchanges of views in order to find a positive solution of this problem. In this connexion I should like to express again my delegation's conviction that an undertaking by the nuclear

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Powers not to use nuclear weapons against the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, as contained in the proposal (ENDC/167) put forward by the USSR in 1966, would constitute a significant contribution to the solution of this problem.

44. In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that our deliberations will be conducive to the elaboration in the near future of a generally acceptable final text of a non-proliferation treaty. We expect that such a treaty will enjoy the full support of all those who have striven persistently for a lessening of international tension and for the elimination of the threat of an armed conflict, particularly a nuclear war.

45. However, we consider it necessary to point out that international tensions and the danger of war do not arise only from the existence of nuclear weapons or the possibility of their spreading. They are caused by the repeated attempts of imperialist forces to impose their will and domination on peoples of other countries by armed force. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, together with other socialist States and along with all peace-loving countries, most resolutely condemns their actions and demands that an end be put to them. If international tension is to be considerably relaxed and the international situation ameliorated, an end must be put to the United States aggression in Viet-Nam, and in particular the air attacks against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam must be stopped without delay and unconditionally. The consequences of Israel's aggression in the Middle East must be eliminated speedily, and, first and foremost, Israel's armed forces must be withdrawn from the occupied territories of the Arab States.

46. The great importance which we attach to the concluding of a non-proliferation treaty does not mean that we over-estimate its role. Like the other participants in our deliberations and in accordance with a number of significant international documents dealing with this question, we do not regard the treaty as the final objective of our negotiations, as a purpose in itself. We regard it as a part of the complex problem of disarmament, a step -- initial but highly significant -- on the way towards general disarmament and particularly towards nuclear disarmament.

47. That is why we regard as a directive guideline for ourselves those paragraphs in the preamble to the drafts which appeal to all States for co-operation in the interest of the cessation of the arms race within the shortest possible time, and which emphasize the necessity for -

(Mr. Winkler, Czechoslovakia)

"... the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" (ENDC/192, 193, p. 2).

48. We are convinced that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty would give a new impetus to the efforts to solve these vital problems and would make it possible for their consideration to proceed under more favourable conditions than heretofore.

49. Alhaji SULE KOLO (Nigeria): I should like first of all to welcome on behalf of the Nigerian Government the tabling of identical treaty texts on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/192, 193) by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union. The event is significant in itself because the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has now been provided with a structure on which to build a balanced treaty. In particular, without in any way derogating from the importance of the present achievement, my delegation wishes to stress the point here that as far as we are concerned we believe that our main task is only just beginning. The consultations that have gone on hitherto have been in the main between the two super-Powers and their allies. We hope that the present situation provides an opportunity for the views and aspirations of the non-aligned countries to receive consideration for inclusion in the draft treaty text.

50. In pursuing our task in this Committee we should bear in mind at every stage that our aim is to produce a treaty which will be acceptable to the world community. We must endeavour to produce something that will earn this Committee not only the praise of the majority of mankind today but also the respect of posterity.

51. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is not a sovereign organ; it is dependent on the United Nations. Its mandates to negotiate various measures of disarmament were given by resolutions of the United Nations. Although that Organization correctly gave top priority to the elaboration of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, certain principles on which the treaty should be based have been clearly stipulated. It may be that blind adherence to the letter of those principles could prevent any agreement whatsoever, but we strongly believe that a treaty produced in utter disregard of them could hardly be equitable. For that reason the Nigerian

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

delegation sincerely hopes that no one here will take the view that the draft texts now before this Committee are near what can be considered adequate; and we hope that all efforts will be directed to finding solutions in this Committee which will meet the anxieties of the world community and the fears of all States.

52. As I said in my brief statement earlier this year (ENDC/PV.292) -- and this clearly stipulated by the United Nations General Assembly in its historic resolution 2028(XX) (ENDC/161) -- the treaty which we eventually produce should be void of any loop-holes which could permit, directly or indirectly, the proliferation of nuclear weapons by nuclear or non-nuclear-weapon States. In this connexion our attention is naturally drawn to the controversy over nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes.

53. The Nigerian delegation is in full agreement with what the representative of Brazil said on 18 May:

"... it is imperative that every nation retain the right to mobilize, without any restriction whatsoever, the whole range of modern technological resources required to eliminate poverty and underdevelopment, which generate grave international tensions." (ENDC/PV.297, para. 42)

The representative of Brazil went on to say:

"We must develop and utilize it [nuclear energy] in every form, including the explosives that make possible not only great civil engineering projects but also an ever-increasing variety of applications that may prove essential to speed up the progress of our peoples." (ibid., para. 43)

54. On the other hand, we have no reason to disbelieve the opinion of the majority of speakers here that the technology required for the production of a nuclear explosive device is the same as that required for the production of a nuclear weapon. The representative of India conceded that point in his statement of 23 May.

He said:

"The Indian delegation does not deny that the technology involved in the production of a nuclear weapon is the same as the technology which produces a peaceful explosive device, although a weapon has many characteristics which are not present in a peaceful device." (ENDC/PV.298, para. 23)

We agree further with the Indian representative that there are many fields of industrial development which are now considered indispensable for economic progress but which can also be used as weapons of destruction.

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

55. The Nigerian delegation none the less feels that nuclear weapons are in a special category. While aeronautics, dynamite and steel fabrication can do great damage in war, they do not have that dreadful element present in nuclear weapons, the ability to destroy civilization as we know it today and cripple humanity at its source. The Nigerian delegation believes that it is because of that crucial difference that the United Nations General Assembly has urged this Committee to give a non-proliferation treaty top priority. So far no delegation has contested the statement made by the United Kingdom delegation on 23 February:

"A device which moves a million tons of earth to dig a canal or create an oil deposit can just as easily pulverize a city of a million people."

(ENDC/PV.288, para. 16)

56. As we see it, the problem of peaceful nuclear explosives is: that of reconciling a situation which can give rise to indirect proliferation by non-nuclear-weapon States with the right to provide all peoples and generations yet unborn with the most effective methods of enhancing their social, economic and cultural well-being. It seems to us that emphasis must be placed on technology rather than on the device itself. We believe that, if non-nuclear-weapon countries were sure that they would have unrestricted access to all the peaceful techniques discovered from the development of weapon technology, the present impasse would be more amenable to solution.

57. The Nigerian delegation doubts very much whether the non-nuclear Powers should -- nor would it be correct to ask them to -- accept a treaty which would place them in a position of perpetual inferiority in any field of knowledge. Consequently, if a treaty is to be lasting it should provide, among other things, guarantees that non-nuclear-weapon Powers would not only have nuclear explosives, through an international organization, for their peaceful projects but also have opportunities for their scientists to develop to the full their intellectual capabilities in all fields, including that of nuclear-explosive technology. One way of ensuring that would be a regular arrangement which would permit scientists from non-nuclear-weapon States to work in close collaboration with scientists working on nuclear-explosive technology in nuclear-weapon States. Such an arrangement would go a long way towards meeting the legitimate aspiration of every State not to be left behind in the application of new techniques to the accelerating of human progress.

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

58. I have been talking about how to prevent loop-holes as regards non-nuclear-weapon States. Now I should like to take a look at the problem of proliferation by nuclear-weapon States. The Nigerian delegation believes that nuclear-weapon Powers must give adequate weight to the anxieties of humanity about its survival. We have been told in very plain language that if there were to be a nuclear war there would not remain untouched any country on the surface of the earth. That is a frightful thought. The nuclear-weapon Powers must concede that if there were to be a nuclear war everyone, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, would be faced with the danger of extermination. The non-nuclear-weapon Powers, therefore, have the right to demand that the nuclear-weapon Powers should begin the process of nuclear disarmament.

59. The first action in that direction would be, in our opinion, an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests underground and the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes. The Nigerian delegation thinks that these are fields in which agreement is not only necessary but possible at the present time. It also believes that all the arguments advanced for urging the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons among non-nuclear-weapon States are valid for urging the nuclear-weapon States to conclude an agreement on the two measures I have just mentioned.

60. As the Polish representative pointed out recently:

"It is common knowledge that those Powers" -- the nuclear-weapon States -- "have accumulated such enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons and have reached such levels of sophistication in these that the emergence of a new nuclear-weapon State could not constitute a threat to them. It would even seem unthinkable to compete with them in this field; first, because they were the first to embark upon the manufacture of nuclear bombs and have thus acquired an edge of more than twenty years over other countries; secondly, because they possess unrivalled economic, technical and scientific resources; and last but not least, because geography is on their side." (ENDC/PV.318, para. 29)

In addition to the incontrovertible facts to which the Polish representative has appropriately drawn our attention, the super-Powers have openly contributed

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

to the general belief that each side has enough nuclear power to destroy the other several times over in the event of a nuclear war. I believe that is the basis of the so-called "deterrent".

61. Thus the Nigerian delegation does not see any reason whatsoever why the nuclear-weapon Powers cannot agree to stop the quantitative and qualitative development of more weapons for, say, ten years -- that is, only half the period by which, according to our Polish colleague, they are ahead of newly emerged nuclear-weapon States -- during which period they would devote their energies to the task of reducing international tension and achieving universal nuclear disarmament. In this connexion the Nigerian delegation has carefully studied the statements made by the representatives of Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom on the verification of the observance of a comprehensive test ban treaty, and it believes that the problem can be solved by a combination of measures. First the Swedish idea of a "nuclear detection club" (ENDC/154) should be given a trial; secondly, an agreement should be reached to ban underground tests of all magnitudes that all sides agree are detectable by national seismographic stations; and thirdly, there should be a moratorium for at least one year on underground tests of lower magnitudes, automatically renewed at the end of every year unless one party believed the agreement had been violated.

62. Let me now direct attention briefly to the problem of security. We agree wholeheartedly with the following statement made by the United States representative at one of our recent meetings:

"The appeal of arms control measures must rest on whether they enhance the security of the nations agreeing to them. In our deliberations on the non-proliferation treaty, for example, I have made clear my Government's conviction that no nation should be asked to sign this treaty if it does not promote its national security within the world community as well as meet the world-wide concern over the growing threat of nuclear war." (ENDC/PV.312, para. 9)

63. That principle, which is basic to all international agreements, applies with equal force to what Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada, has described as measures of non-armament in conventional weapons of the developing countries

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

(ENDC/PV.311). I think that the Canadian idea, like the ideal aim of general and complete disarmament, is laudable, and my delegation stands today by what the Nigerian representative said on 18 August 1966 (ENDC/PV.283, pp.12, 13) in support of the United States proposal that -

"... countries, on a regional basis, explore ways to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons often sought for reasons of illusory prestige."

(ENDC/165, p.3)

What the Nigerian representative said was, however, not without reservations. In the passage quoted by Mr. Burns, my predecessor made it quite clear that President Johnson's proposals would be valuable for Africa, and we think that is applicable to all other continents.

64. The Nigerian delegation believes that the problem of limiting arms in developing countries is no less complicated than that of universal disarmament. Developing regions are not worlds apart. They live in a mixed, strange world, a world of poverty and avarice, of meekness and modernized savagery, of grandeur and meanness, a world in which, I am afraid, power is taking over from reason. This is the world we live in, developed or less developed.

65. We do not have to look too far back to see glaring illustrations of the traits I have just enumerated. Recently the situation has degenerated even to the extent that foreign soldiers now constitute themselves into pirate groups to loot, pillage and undermine the security of developing countries. It is extremely important to realize that no agreement reached among developing countries to limit armament in their regions could last if developed countries did nothing to stop their nationals from shipping arms to dissident groups in developing countries to be used against governments. The situation is serious and, as my predecessor said, creates fear and anxiety.

66. It should be clear that, with developed neighbours arming furiously, developing countries cannot be expected to manifest perfect serenity. What is more, the question is not purely regional, for wars are fought not only between developing countries but also between developed and developing countries. Consequently any measures of conventional disarmament or non-armament must be general. On the other hand, we agree with the Canadian representative when he says:

"... we must all concede that it is likely to be some time before agreement is reached on a treaty of general disarmament, or even on a treaty of world-wide application providing for the reduction of conventional arms."

(ENDC/PV.311, para. 18)

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

What we do not agree with, however, is the logic that the problem should lead us into making the less developed regions the "sitting duck" in a world armed to the teeth. I believe that, whatever we do, we should not do anything that will make it impossible for States to guarantee their security to the maximum extent.

67. However, returning to non-proliferation, I believe sincerely that the majority of countries --- and I think I am speaking for all the non-aligned members of this Committee --- would want to sign a non-proliferation treaty. At the same time the non-nuclear Powers, I think, are mature enough to realize that by signing such a treaty they would be depriving themselves of one weapon which could today or tomorrow be crucial for their self-defence. It is incumbent on the international community, therefore, to ensure that no country which accepts its responsibility in this regard should become the victim of wanton acts of destruction. I think we should here borrow a leaf from the Charter of the United Nations, which, while denouncing war as a means of foreign policy, took pains to devise a collective security system which could be useful.

68. In the light of the foregoing, we believe that the treaty should contain firm assurances that the world community would come to the aid of a non-nuclear-weapon Power if threatened or attacked by a nuclear-weapon State. That is no less essential to a non-proliferation treaty than the collective security system is to the Charter of the United Nations. If we failed to provide such an assurance, we should have no moral right to criticize those who found themselves unable to sign the treaty because their national security needs had not been considered in it -- a situation which might be fatal to the treaty.

69. Finally, the Nigerian delegation would like to express its deep regret that the draft treaty texts before this Committee have not dealt at all with one of the most important aspects of a non-proliferation treaty: that of verification. In this regard, my delegation would like to welcome the initiative of the representative of Sweden this morning, because we must emphasize that a treaty without a thorough-going control system would not be acceptable generally. We doubt that it would be acceptable to anybody. What is more, we believe that a control system, to be reliable and useful, should be conducted by an international agency. However, existing regional arrangements should not be hampered by the international agency. The latter should be able to collaborate with the regional agencies in the control effort.

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

What is essential is that the international agency should decide the rules to be applied by regional organs to enable it to carry out its duties efficaciously.

70. The urgency of the task before us cannot be over-emphasized. As I said in my earlier statement, this Committee has a duty to humanity which it should perform. We must go about it with sincerity of purpose, justice and a sense of equity.

71. Mr. TRIVEDI (India): The Indian delegation made a short statement on 24 August (ENDC/PV.325) when the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union presented two documents, ENDC/192 and ENDC/193, containing a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Indian delegation then cited some of the considerations which have guided us and will guide us in our examination of those documents.

72. The Indian delegation will make a detailed statement with comments and suggestions at a later meeting, but this morning I thought I must intervene to congratulate Mr. Azeredo da Silveira on one of the most outstanding contributions made to our debates during the whole course of the discussions on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He indicated what would really constitute the solution of the problem, and did not deal merely with a mirage. The representative of Brazil, in his short statement, touched upon a few important issues in the draft treaty. Obviously he did not discuss the questions of amendment, withdrawal and other ancillary matters. He dealt with the two missing parts of the treaty: the question of security concerns and the question of international control. He only touched upon the question of disarmament, but otherwise, on the vital aspects of the treaty, he made a very profound statement. The approach which Mr. Azeredo da Silveira indicated --- and the basic approach indicated by Mr. Sule Kolo in his very able and pertinent intervention this morning --- have the support of the Indian delegation. With regard to the statement made by Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, the Indian delegation is not only fully in agreement with his approach but also entirely in accord with the specific points made by him on the fundamental and vital components of a non-proliferation treaty.

73. The Indian delegation has had occasion to speak at one of our earlier meetings about the confusion which is being created on the question of proliferation proper and other issues of disarmament. Mr. Azeredo da Silveira pointed out:

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

"We are not questioning whether or not the nuclear Powers should stay nuclear until a final solution can be brought to the question of nuclear disarmament; but it seems to us imperative that the obligations imposed on the non-nuclear nations be met on the other side by significant commitments related to the subject matter of the treaty." (supra, para.5)

The important phrase here is "the subject matter of the treaty". The subject matter of the treaty is prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, as the representative of Brazil pointed out, that refers to proliferation by all countries. Therefore attempts to confuse the issue by vivisectioning the corporate body of non-proliferation, as it were, and then lumping part of that amputated portion of non-proliferation with other aspects of disarmament, such as the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles or the reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons, and saying that it is difficult to have all these things done together, that the best is the enemy of the good, that we must not be over-ambitious, and so on, do not help matters. What is pertinent is that proliferation has to be prevented; and, as General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) points out, proliferation by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon Powers has to be prevented. Mr. Azeredo da Silveira emphasized that admirably.

74. The representative of Brazil referred to that matter as well as to the security concerns of non-nuclear nations and to the attempt to impose prohibitions on the peaceful development of nuclear energy in certain fields even if -- I repeat, even if -- such development is subjected to objective and non-discriminatory international inspection. As the Indian delegation said earlier (ENDC/PV.298, para. 26), it is like throwing out the baby with the bath-water. Mr. Azeredo da Silveira also referred to the question of international control, and this morning we heard too the very useful initiative taken by the Minister from Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal. The approach adopted by the representative of Sweden, that of non-discriminatory and universal application of safeguards, is the correct approach, and in document ENDC/195 that approach has been applied to the dissemination aspect of a non-proliferation treaty.

75. The Indian delegation -- in common, I believe, with the Brazilian and other delegations -- would like the same approach to be applied to the proliferation aspect of a non-proliferation treaty as well. As Mr. Azeredo da Silveira said:

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

"The conditions of world security and peace to which I have been referring would also be greatly enhanced if the universal application of safeguards concerning fissionable material were made compulsory for all parties to the treaty." (supra, para. 13)

The approach that the Indian delegation has commended in the statements of Mr. Azeredo da Silveira and Mr. Sule Kolo, and also in the initiative taken by the representative of Sweden, is that particular approach of universality and non-discrimination. What I really wish to emphasize is that it is not desirable, profitable, effective, appropriate or adequate to vivisection the integral problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 327th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador E.L.M. Burns, representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Brazil, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Nigeria and India.

"The delegation of Sweden tabled a draft text of an article on international control to be inserted in the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/195).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 5 September 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.327/Corr.1
21 September 1967
ENGLISH AND FRENCH ONLY

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 31 August 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

Corrigendum

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

NOV 29 1967

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

Paragraph 21. In the fourth and third lines from the end read:

".... proposals. In order to simplify the presentation and as an
example, ..."

Paragraph 25. Second line, in place of "This concerns transfers of
special nuclear material from one State to another." read "This concerns
transfers of nuclear material from one State to another."

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